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By Ronald H. Filler
On “Black Monday,” October 19, 1987, 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 
22%. It was an unusually volatile trading 
day in which the US stock market expe-
rienced its largest single-day decline. The 
market volatility caused many brokerage 
firms to fail and resulted in losses to cus-
tomers beyond the declining price of their 
holdings. These losses were caused by the 
bankruptcy of their brokerages.
Over the past 80 years, laws and regu-
lations have evolved to provide greater 
protections to customers of US brokerage 
firms. However, they are not always effec-
tive, particularly on volatile trading days.
The US Congress and market regula-
tors want all US residents to open bank 
accounts, and to feel comfortable that their 
funds deposited in banks are protected. To 
that end, the government provides insur-
ance protection on bank account deposits 
through the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). Thanks to FDIC 
insurance, people no longer need to fear 
the “Wild, Wild West” stories of bank 
robbers fleeing with their deposits.
However, banks can freely use customer 
deposits for legitimate business reasons, 
such as making auto and small business 
loans, issuing home mortgages, etc. To 
support these banking arrangements and 
to encourage people to deposit their funds 
in a bank account, the FDIC program 
provides important insurance protections 
to bank customers in the event their bank 
is robbed, or fails for any reason.
Historically, FDIC insurance topped 
out at $100,000, but it was increased 
in 2008 to $250,000. For married cou-
ples, the $250,000 ceiling applies to each 
spouse’s account and a joint account in 
their names, as each account is for a differ-
ent beneficial owner. Therefore, for singles 
the maximum coverage is $250,000, but 
for married couples it could be as high 
as $750,000. If a person has more cash 
than is covered by these ceilings, he or she 
should open accounts at multiple banks.
The same is true for stock brokerage 
accounts. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has adopted specific 
regulations that protect customers who 
fully pay for their securities (SEC Rule 
15c3-3), but stock brokerage firms also use 
customer funds and securities for other 
purposes, especially when customers buy 
stocks on margin. Under these circum-
stances, the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC) program caps out at 
$500,000 (no more than $250,000 in cash) 
for a single person, but it also expands its 
insurance coverage for married couples, 
similar to the FDIC program.
There are exceptions to these rules, how-
ever. An example from recent financial his-
tory is the Bernie Madoff case. Madoff stole 
more than $50 billion from his stock cus-
tomers in an elaborate Ponzi scheme. Sev-
eral court cases resulted when his scheme 
was unraveled. The courts held that many 
of Madoff’s customers could not receive 
additional insurance coverage if they had 
previously withdrawn amounts from their 
accounts with him over the years.
For example, if someone had deposited 
$700,000 with Madoff in 1998, let’s assume 
his account increased in value to $1.8 mil-
lion. If that person withdrew $500,000 in 
2004 (leaving a balance of $1.3 million) 
and tried to claim his $500,000 in insur-
ance coverage once the Ponzi scheme was 
discovered in December 2008, he would be 
out of luck. The SIPC Trustee appointed to 
oversee the Madoff estate said, in essence, 
that since he had already received more 
than $500,000 in 2004, he was not entitled 
to additional insurance coverage.
Futures and Swaps
Unlike bank and brokerage accounts, there 
is no insurance coverage program for 
accounts used to trade futures contracts 
and swaps, even though these financial 
products are subject to significant laws 
and regulations. The reason is simple; 
these markets are primarily institutional 
in nature, so they do not have the same 
public policy reason for the insurance as 
banks and stock brokerage firms, which are 
primarily retail in nature. The US Congress 
recognized this as far back as 1936, when it 
adopted the Commodity Exchange Act and 
added Section 4d, which required then, and 
still mandates today, that all futures com-
mission merchants (FCM) — e.g., futures 
brokerage firms — maintain all customer 
assets held by the FCM in a “customer seg-
regated” account at a custodian bank.
This concept can be visualized as a ring 
fence around a specially protected cus-
tomer asset account. Thus, if the FCM fails 
for any reason, creditors of that FCM can-
not pierce that ring and use the customer 
assets held inside it to satisfy its debts. 
Moreover, FCMs cannot commingle its 
own assets with the customer assets held 
in this protected account.
Customer segregation has worked quite 
well over the past 80 years. There have been 
a few bumps along the way but, for the most 
part, any time an FCM has failed, its cus-
tomer assets have been protected. However, 
if there were not sufficient customer assets in 
the segregated account — and thus a short-
fall occurred — pursuant to the US Bank-
ruptcy Code (the Code), the remaining non-
defaulting customers would be treated on a 
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Bank failure notice from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation is tacked up on the New 
Jersey Title Guarantee and Trust Company’s door 
in 1939. At the time, it was by far the largest bank 
failure to be paid off by the FDIC since its inception.
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pro rata basis, and each would share equally 
based on the percentage of the shortfall.
For example, if a segregated account 
should hold $100 million of customer 
assets, but only $98 million was in the 
account at the close of a business day, 
there would be a 2% shortfall. If the cus-
tomer had deposited $100,000 with that 
FCM to meet his margin requirements, 
then he would only receive $98,000 back, 
taking into effect that shortfall.
Notable Bankruptcies:  
Lehman, MF Global and Peregrine
There have been some noteworthy FCM 
bankruptcies in recent years. The largest 
involved Lehman Brothers, which filed for 
bankruptcy in September 2008. On Mon-
day, September 15, Lehman had approxi-
mately $10 billion in customer assets. By 
the close of business on Friday, September 
19, all futures positions had been either 
transferred to other FCMs or liquidated, 
and all customer assets were properly 
transferred without a dollar lost by any 
of Lehman’s futures customers. It showed 
that if an FCM follows the applicable laws 
and regulations, then the system works.
That is not always the case, however. 
On October 31, 2011, another large FCM, 
MF Global, filed for bankruptcy with a 
shortfall of approximately $1.2 billion in 
customer funds. While MF Global’s cus-
tomers did eventually receive 100% of 
their assets, they initially got back only 
70%. The remaining 30% was transferred 
to them over the next few years.
A few months later, another FCM, Pere-
grine Financial Group, filed for bankruptcy 
with a shortfall of approximately $200 mil-
lion. That FCM only had $400 million in 
customer assets, so the shortfall totaled 
nearly 50%. Because of these two bankrupt-
cies and the resulting shortfalls in their 
customer segregated accounts, a number 
of regulatory changes have recently taken 
place. Most notably, all FCMs and their cus-
todian banks holding customer assets must 
now report their account balances each 
morning to the regulators. Thus, the regu-
lators can now compare the amount that 
should be held in its customer segregated 
account to the totals shown in its various 
custodian accounts. If any significant differ-
ence occurs, the regulators can take imme-
diate action to determine the reason for the 
difference. Prior to this rule, FCMs only 
reported their balances on a monthly basis.
Another major regulatory change 
requires the CEO or his designee to 
approve any transfer of 25% or more 
out of the customer segregated account. 
Most FCMs today deposit a large amount 
of their own capital into the segregated 
account to ensure, to the extent possible, 
that no shortfall in the account will occur. 
This FCM capital investment is called 
the “residual interest.” Once the FCM’s 
capital is so deposited into the customer 
segregated account, it is deemed to be 
“customer property.” This means that if 
the FCM fails for any reason, its capital 
so deposited will first be treated to protect 
the FCM’s customers and may not be used 
by any of its creditors until the customers 
receive 100% of their assets back.
Assuming the FCM is doing well but 
wants to transfer back some of its own 
capital that was held in the customer seg-
regated account, 
Headline from the Philadelphia Inquirer during the Crash of 1987.
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the senior-most officer of that FCM must 
approve that transfer. This is commonly 
referred to as the “Jon Corzine Rule.” 
Corzine was the CEO of MF Global at the 
time of its bankruptcy, and a large amount 
of funds had been transferred out of the 
segregated account.
There are some key legal distinctions 
involving the failure of an FCM versus that 
of a stock brokerage firm. The insolvency 
of a stock brokerage firm is governed by 
the Securities Investor Protection Act and 
Section III of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
These laws provide the special SIPC insur-
ance coverage noted above. An FCM’s 
bankruptcy is governed by Section IV of 
the US Bankruptcy Code and Part 190 
of the CFTC regulations. Together, they 
deal with the pro rata treatment of the 
non-defaulting customers of the failed 
FCM. They also do not treat property of a 
customer that can be specifically identified 
as belonging to that customer.
This is not the case for stock brokerage 
firms that fail. If a customer owns 100 
shares of ABC, then he will receive back 
those 100 shares. On the other hand, if 
a customer deposits US Treasury bills 
to satisfy his margin requirements in a 
futures account, those government secu-
rities will be sold and converted to cash, 
with the customer receiving his pro rata 
share if a shortfall occurs
Customer Protection in Global Markets
The industry has learned quite a bit in 
recent years given these large FCM bank-
ruptcies, but there is more to be done given 
that today’s markets are clearly global in 
nature. People living in the United States 
can now easily trade financial products on 
more than 35 non-US exchanges. Yet, the 
bankruptcy laws in those countries vary 
greatly from the US Bankruptcy Code, 
which has specific provisions dealing with 
the failure of a stock brokerage firm (Sec-
tion III) and the failure of an FCM (Sec-
tion IV). Outside the United States, many 
countries do not have laws protecting 
customers of failed financial firms.
What is now urgently needed is for the 
G-20 countries to devise a plan to harmo-
nize the bankruptcy laws of these coun-
tries so that customers of failed financial 
firms are treated fairly, hopefully with 
similar, or approximately similar, results. 
Most of the focus since the financial crisis 
in 2008 has dealt with how OTC deriva-
tives should be regulated. The G-20 coun-
tries are gaining ground on the promise 
they all made in Pittsburgh in September 
2009 to have a more harmonized global 
regulatory system in place that regulates 
OTC derivatives. Now, they need to focus 
on protecting customers of failed financial 
firms in a more harmonized way. 
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Jon S. Corzine, former chairman and CEO of MF Global, testifies before the House Financial Services 
Committee on December 15, 2011. US authorities were investigating whether MF Global intentionally tapped 
customer funds to cover the bankrupt firm’s margin payments on European government bond trades.
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